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precedented difficulties, was not as creditable to the German agencies of preparation and execution as the war of 1870-1871. Perhaps, von Tirpitz was right when he wrote in his diary (September 7, 1914), "all would go well, if we had an *Iron Chancellor* and an *old Kaiser*."

A good translation of this work is published by Hutchinson and Company, London. It includes the maps, with one unimportant exception. The index of names is not as faulty as the German, but is decidedly poor. The two Generals von Below (Otto and Fritz) are indexed as General von Below. General von Bülow and the former Chancellor von Bülow are indexed as General von Bülow.

A translation published by Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, has the same text as Hutchinson's, but no index. It has the same maps, but some of the larger ones are so reduced in size that many of the names are illegible. It is entitled *The German General Staff and its Decisions, 1914-1916*.

JOHN BIGELOW.

Im Weltkrieg. Von OTTOKAR CZERNIN. (Berlin and Vienna: Ullstein und Co. 1919. Pp. xi, 428.)

AMONG the swarm of revelations that are appearing in connection with the diplomatic history of the war, Count Czernin's book is one of the really notable ones. It is true he is disappointing, for he continually makes us feel that he might have told us much more if he had chosen to, but, as far as he goes, he is well worth attention. He was altogether the ablest Austrian statesman at the helm during the war period; he knows his facts and they are inside ones; and he writes clearly and with apparent straightforwardness, giving us the Austrian point of view as distinct from the German one with which we are familiar. His expression of his own opinions and aims is perhaps even more interesting. Though never abusive, he is frank in his language about his German allies and especially about Ludendorff and the military party, whose policy he regards as responsible for bringing their country to ruin. As for his own policy, his main thesis is that Austria was too completely in the hands of her powerful friend for her to be able to make peace alone. Any attempt to do so would have been suppressed, and suppressed by force if need be. Another objection to a separate arrangement was that the Allies, by the famous treaty of London of 1915, had committed themselves to the dismemberment of Austria. Count Czernin comes back to this point again and again, arguing that the agreement rendered it impossible for Austria to withdraw from the struggle. His own great object as foreign minister was to bring about a general peace, even at the cost of painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Empires. To his thinking, the main objection was the question of Alsace-Lorraine, because France, supported by England, would not lay down her arms until she had won back her lost provinces. He therefore made strenuous efforts to persuade Germany to surrender them, and in return he

was willing to give up Austrian Poland and other Polish territory to Germany—perhaps getting compensation for Austria in Rumania. In this policy he was supported by Emperor Charles and, in Germany, he met with some response for a moment; even the Crown Prince was inclined to listen to him, but the military party totally refused to entertain the idea, and they had their way.

One of the best features of this book is the author's keen judgment and his apparent frankness in telling us his impressions of some of the people with whom he came into contact. He had long known intimately the unfortunate Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and he gives us a pathetic and kindly picture of him. At the same time, he openly admits many of his faults and expresses disbelief that if the archduke had lived to become emperor he could have carried out his policies and rejuvenated the empire. The reader certainly gets the same impression. Count Czernin adds: "The structure of the monarchy which he wished to support and strengthen was already so decayed that it could not stand any strong shock and it would probably have collapsed if not from this war from without, from within through revolution." This is a rather startling admission from a high Austrian official of the old régime.

Among other interesting things in the volume, we note particularly the remarks on the character of Kaiser William and the extracts from Count Czernin's diary at Brest-Litovsk, also his account of the peace of Bucharest. On the other hand, he tells us nothing of the circumstances that led to his own fall from office. Let us hope that we shall hear from him again.

Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 1914-1918. Von ERICH [von] LUDENDORFF. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn. 1919. Pp. viii, 628.)

Ludendorff's Own Story, August 1914-November 1918: the Great War from the Siege of Liège to the Signing of the Armistice as viewed from the Grand Headquarters of the German Army. By ERICH VON LUDENDORFF, Quartermaster-General of the German Army. In two volumes. (New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1919. Pp. ix, 477; 473. \$7.50.)

ON August 29, 1916, von Hindenburg succeeded von Falkenhayn as chief of staff of the German army. Von Ludendorff was made assistant chief of staff with the title of first quartermaster-general. He held this office until October 26, 1918, about two weeks before the armistice. Von Falkenhayn had held it from September 14, 1914, about two months after the beginning of the war, until he resigned it in August, 1916. The stories of von Falkenhayn and von Ludendorff cover the activities of the general staff almost through the war, but while von Falkenhayn confines himself to the two years of his incumbency as chief of staff, von Ludendorff embraces his whole four years of war service.